ABSTRACT. 鈥斅營 propose to re-conceive the debate on natural kinds from the perspective of conceptual engineering. I take 鈥榥atural鈥� kinds in a broadly naturalist way, seeing a continuity between philosophical thinking and empirical inquiry in the natural sciences. This naturalist take on natural kinds recognizes that an important part of good scientific research is continual…
TITLE: Against Conservative Ontology ABSTRACT:聽In his recent book聽Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary聽(2015), Dan Z. Korman argues in favour of conservatism in metaphysics, that is, very roughly, that what we聽ordinarily聽take there to be is true. Especially, we are right about how many objects there are and what these objects are supposed to be. Korman takes…
Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However, in focusing predominantly on beliefs鈥� mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives鈥攖hese theories have their own theoretical blindspots.…
ABSTRACT. 鈥斅燱e are living in times where there is considerable debate over what sex and gender are and who gets to be of what sex and what gender. These are questions that impact people’s lives greatly, some more than others. They are metaphysical questions but they also concern what principles we should be guided by…
TITLE: Fundamentality Without Favouritism ABSTRACT: According to a widely endorsed conception of fundamentality, the fundamental is characterized in terms of a certain privileged relation or set of relations. On this conception, something is fundamental just in case it is unexplained relative to a unique privileged relation or a privileged set of relations. Let us say…
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