A virtual seminar by Zoom

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精东传媒, KY16 9L United Kingdom
Website /arche/venue/edgecliffe-g03-2/

Events at this venue

Today

  • Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) “Higher-Order Evidence, First-Order Beliefs”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 精东传媒, United Kingdom

    Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a…

  • Conceptual Engineering Seminar |聽Genoveva Mart铆 (Barcelona): “How Flexible (or Tolerant) Is Too Flexible (or Tolerant)?”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 精东传媒, United Kingdom

    Joint work w/ Lorena Ram铆rez-Lude帽a (Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona) ABSTRACT. 鈥斅燱e will discuss two different phenomena of language usage that we have characterized in past work as flexibility and tolerance. We will examine their relation, or lack thereof, to conceptual engineering and we will apply the distinctions discussed to the specific case of the legal…

  • Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Kathrin Koslicki (Universit茅 de Neuch芒tel)

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 精东传媒, United Kingdom

    TITLE: Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions ABSTRACT: According to Amie Thomasson鈥檚 author-intention-based account of artifacts, an artifact of kind K is essentially a product of a largely successful intention to create something of kind K (see, e.g., Thomasson (2003), 鈥淩ealism and Human Kinds鈥�, Philosophy and聽Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 592-602).…

  • Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Renee Bolinger (Princeton) “Are We Entitled to Be Believed?”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 精东传媒, United Kingdom

    Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice, moral encroachment, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of…