精东传媒

Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent鈥檚 belief, in the same way perception, memory, reasoning or testimony are, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk, I argue that this problem can be overcome…

Abstract:聽Novelty鈥攗nderstood as the value of saying something new鈥攁ppears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this, however, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric…

Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However, in focusing predominantly on beliefs鈥� mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives鈥攖hese theories have their own theoretical blindspots.…

Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice, moral encroachment, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of…

Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a…

Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant), whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an…

Abstract: What is the nature of one鈥檚 justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, I…

Abstract: Hinge propositions, or simply 鈥渉inges鈥�, are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose in our normal inquiries. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology, which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma leveled against hinge epistemologists. The…

Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant), whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an…