精东传媒

Abstract: What is it to engage in moral inquiry? The received wisdom is that it is to answer moral questions 鈥� that is, questions about what we ought to do. Someone has moral expertise to the extent to which she is reliable at arriving at true answers to those questions. Philosophical disagreements have focused on…

Abstract: An a priori lie is a lie that conflicts with an a priori truth. Rather sportingly, the liar leaves himself open to refutation by armchair methods such as calculation. My thesis is that Immanuel Kant precludes the existence of a priori lies. For asserting a proposition requires raising a rational expectation of its truth.…

Abstract:聽Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value 鈥� which are often simplified, standardized, and quantified 鈥� and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point…

Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with…

Abstract: In this work-in-progress, I build from Iris Marion Young鈥檚 notions of inclusion and exclusion and Kristie Dotson鈥檚 framework of epistemic oppression, to show how some traditional views about what counts as a good source of justification can participate to internal epistemic exclusion, which contributes to second order epistemic oppression. Whilst theories of justification often…

Abstract:聽The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality, and in particular, how logical akrasia poses a challenge to the tenability of the controversial 铿亁ed point thesis.

Abstract: What is the nature of one鈥檚 justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, I…

Abstract: In this talk I examine, and rebut, Goldberg鈥檚 (2020) arguments in favour of a conversational norm that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates assent (NSR). Using evidence from conversational analysis I show that Goldberg is wrong to claim that our linguistic communities de facto conform to this norm in conversation.…

Abstract: In this paper, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of 鈥渂eing known鈥� and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the 鈥渞ight to know,鈥� I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have…

Abstract: This paper (which is very much a work in progress) will develop the concept of聽extractivist epistemology聽as a way to think through the effect of colonialism on knowing practices. Extractivist epistemologies work analogously to extractivist capitalism: seeking an epistemic resource of some sort—such as a piece of pharmacological knowledge held by an indigenous community or…

Abstract: Knowledge by sight is a standard paradigm of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge by mathematical proof is a standard paradigm of a priori knowledge. However, I will argue that the two types of knowledge have so much in common that the a priori – a posteriori distinction cannot go very deep.