{"id":7769,"global_id":"www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents?id=7769","global_id_lineage":["www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents?id=7769","www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche?id=7568"],"author":"1","status":"publish","date":"2021-08-24 21:09:30","date_utc":"2021-08-24 20:09:30","modified":"2021-11-22 17:08:28","modified_utc":"2021-11-22 17:08:28","url":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/metaphysics-seminar-10\/","rest_url":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/tribe\/events\/v1\/events\/7769","title":"Metaphysics Seminar Lorraine Keller (Saint Joseph\u2019s University)","description":"

Title: The Access Problem for Act-type Theories of Propositions<\/p>\n

Abstract: Recent work on propositions has seen the rise of act-type theories, according to which propositions are types of cognitive acts that derive their representational and truth-conditional properties from the token cognitive acts of agents. Act-type theories have been gaining traction as part of a rejection of what is called the \u2018Fregean conception\u2019, a \u201ctraditional\u201d conception of propositions according to which they are intrinsically representational, mind- and language-independent abstracta, while cognitive attitudes such as belief and doubt derive their representational properties from their relation to propositions. Act-type theorists present two main objections to the Fregean conception:<\/p>\n