BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.17.0//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T110000 DTSTAMP:20211101T155343Z CREATED:20210803T182403Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T155343Z UID:10001352-1635759000-1635764400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-16/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 精东传媒\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T170000 DTSTAMP:20211101T155343Z CREATED:20210803T182404Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T155343Z UID:10001353-1635778800-1635786000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of 精东传媒) DESCRIPTION:Title: On Beall and Camrud鈥檚 defence of the combinatorial argument for FDE\n\nAbstract:聽In their 2020 paper 鈥淔DE all the way up鈥漒, Beall and Camrud aim to defend a particular combinatorial argument for the paraconsistent and paracomplete logic FDE against a natural objection. The argument\, roughly\, states that\, since logic must consider all possibilities\, it is not enough to have the 鈥楾rue鈥 and the 鈥楩alse鈥 in the correct set of truth-values but there also must be all combinations of these two fundamental truth-values\, namely 鈥楤oth True and False鈥 and 鈥楴either True Nor False鈥. Including those combinatorial truth-values yields FDE. The objection Beall and Camrud consider consists in the idea that it must be possible to iterate the processus of combining truth-values. The gist of Beall and Camrud鈥檚 defence is that iterating the operation of 鈥榯aking combinations of truth-values鈥 do not change the logic after one gets to FDE.聽 In this talk\, I argue that their defence fails because the formal definition of the operation of 鈥榯aking combinations of truth-values鈥 that they use\, namely Priest鈥檚 positive plurivalence\, fails to deliver FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic. Indeed\, I argue\, one must stay consistent in what notion of 鈥榯aking combinations of truth-values鈥 one uses throughout the combinatorial argument and the defence against the objection. One can find\, to my knowledge\, two such notions in the literature: Priest鈥檚 positive plurivalence and Priest鈥檚 general plurivalence. Depending on which one uses\, one find oneself with a combinatorial argument (immune to the natural objection) for Priest鈥檚 logic LP or Oller鈥檚 logic AL. The conclusion of the talk takes the form of a challenge: to defend the combinatorial argument for FDE against the natural objection\, one must find a notion of 鈥榯aking combinations of truth-values鈥 which (a) produces the four-valued matrix of FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic and (b) always produces FDE as a logic when iterated starting from the four-valued matrix of FDE. The notion used by Beall and Camrud in their paper satisfies (b) but fails to satisfy (a). By contrast\, I put forward in the talk a natural proposal which satisfies (a) but fails to satisfy (b). This leaves me quite skeptical that the challenge can be met and that any such combinatorial argument for FDE can survive the natural objection. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 精东传媒\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T140000 DTSTAMP:20211102T160812Z CREATED:20210804T182411Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211102T160812Z UID:10001354-1635854400-1635861600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Daniel Garibay Garcia (精东传媒) DESCRIPTION:Deborah Tollefsen鈥檚 鈥淐an Groups Assert that P?鈥 URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-9/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T170000 DTSTAMP:20211102T160812Z CREATED:20210804T182412Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211102T160812Z UID:10001355-1635865200-1635872400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar 鈥 Kevin Scharp (University of 精东传媒) 鈥 DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-18/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000 DTSTAMP:20211103T162307Z CREATED:20210831T171158Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211103T162307Z UID:10001397-1635951600-1635955200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-68/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T180000 DTSTAMP:20211103T160811Z CREATED:20210805T183036Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211103T160811Z UID:10001356-1635955200-1635962400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Lara Jost DESCRIPTION:For this session\, Lara Jost will lead a discussion of the second chapter of Myisha Cherry鈥檚 new book 鈥楾he Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle鈥. \nTitle: Fitting Fury and Frightful Rage\, Myisha Cherry\nAbstract: Chapter 2 argues that Lordean rage is an appropriate response to racial injustice and is more likely to correctly represent racial injustice than the other variations of rage. The chapter claims that this apt and correct Lordean rage is morally and politically valuable because it not only registers racial injustice but it appreciates justice. Lordean rage says that racial justice is worth having. It also not only marks disvalue\, but it is a way to respond to the value that racial minorities in the United States have. The chapter also explores ways to escape strategic traps set by others to make the outraged doubt their anger and give it up. URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-7/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arch茅 Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T120000 DTSTAMP:20211104T160811Z CREATED:20210806T184151Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T160811Z UID:10001357-1636020000-1636027200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-14/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T143000 DTSTAMP:20211104T160812Z CREATED:20210806T184152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T160812Z UID:10001358-1636030800-1636036200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) 鈥淐arroll鈥檚 Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation鈥 DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one鈥檚 justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-18/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T173000 DTSTAMP:20211104T162308Z CREATED:20210830T171138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T162308Z UID:10001387-1636041600-1636047000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk 鈥 Thomas Hurka (University of Toronto) DESCRIPTION:Title: 鈥淎gainst 鈥楪ood For\,鈥 Against 鈥榃ell-Being鈥欌漒n\nAbstract:聽This paper challenges the widely held view that 鈥榞ood for鈥橽, 鈥榳ell- being鈥橽, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from 鈥榮imply good鈥 as used by G.E. Moore and others. More specifically\, it argues that there鈥檚 no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that鈥檚聽neither聽merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic聽nor reducible to 鈥榮imply good鈥. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value 鈥榞ood for鈥 expresses is distinctively 鈥榮ubject-relative鈥. Neither interpretation\, the paper argues\, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental such concept is just 鈥榮imply good鈥. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-thomas-hurka-university-of-toronto/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Enrico Galvagni":MAILTO:eg240@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR