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Abstract: Meinong’s object theory is thought by many to be inconsistent (or even trivial). Indeed, its most straightforward formalisation in second-order logic is. However, contemporary logicians have developed more subtle formalisations of Meinong’s ideas, the so-called neo-Meinongian logics, that are provably consistent. In this talk, I review two of the main approachs, Nuclear Meinongianism and Dual Copula Meinongianism, and I develop…

Title: On Numbers as Kinds Abstract: I discuss the neo-aristotelian ontology presented in Lowe (2006), drawing particular attention at Lowe’s notions of objects and pluralities, and his conception of natural numbers as universals. I argue that Lowe’s treatment of numbers and pluralities is useful to those who believe that non-individual entities exist and can be…

Abstract: Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating, more simply, that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of the standard characterization crucially depends both on how the notion of composition is related to the notion…

Title: Mini-Meno: How to Get More Out of Your Transmission Abstract: My positive thesis is that competent deduction can add justification not already present in the premise – contrary to a tradition inaugurated by Plato’s dialogue Meno. My negative thesis is there is a novel counter-example to Counter-closure. According to this conservative principle, if you now…

Metaphysical structure is the way things hang together, in and of themselves, and aside from their causes and effects and propensities to behave. Examples include: truth depending on reality, the mind depending on the brain, sets depending on their members, disjunctions depending on their disjuncts, wholes depending on their parts, types being realised by their…

Abstract: This talk develops ontological pluralism about non-being, the view that there are multiple ways, kinds, or modes of non-being. I suggest that the view is both more plausible and defensible than it first seems, and that it has many useful applications across a wide variety of metaphysical and explanatory problems. After drawing out the relationship…

Title: How Serious is Serious Actualism? Abstract: Serious Actualism is a view which many find compelling: it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist. In this talk, I aim to do two things. First, I argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a property of nonexistence and…