BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20250330T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20251026T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20260329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20261025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20270328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20271031T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260220T075348Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T173815Z UID:10002729-1778079600-1778086800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-16/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260501T173814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260506T182311Z UID:10002888-1778079600-1778086800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: NO MEETING THIS WEEK DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-patrick-greenough-flexible-essence-and-flexible-identity/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, University of 精东传媒\, 精东传媒\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260220T075400Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260503T175321Z UID:10002736-1778684400-1778691600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-17/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260504T175326Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260513T190825Z UID:10002889-1778684400-1778691600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Greg Restall\, 鈥淭he Logic of Paradox as a Substructural Logic鈥 DESCRIPTION:Graham Priest鈥檚 simple three-valued logic LP has many curious properties. It has the same valid formulas as classical logic\, but differs from classical logic when it comes to valid聽sequents. The valid sequents do not uniquely characterise the logic: it is possible to have more than one different LP-鈥渘egation鈥漒, each of which satisfies all the LP-requirements\, without being equivalent. (The situation is not unlike modal operators in your favoured modal logic. A modal logic like S5 does not uniquely determine the meaning of the modal operators. The same goes for LP when characterised in terms of its consequence relation.)\n\n\n\nOne consequence of this fact is that extant proof-first characterisations of LP are unwieldy. In some systems\, connectives are given rules featuring negation and rules without; in others\, formulas occur positively or negatively signed\, and in others\, sequents have three positions in which formulas can occur instead of two. This makes relating LP to familiar logics on a proof-first basis difficult. \nThe simple three-valued logic ST (strict-tolerant logic) also has many curious properties. It has the same valid formulas聽and聽valid sequents as classical logic\, but differs from classical logic at the level of meta-inferential validity (rules obtaining between sequents). In ST\, the聽Cut聽rule is not generally valid: from A 鈬 B and B 鈬 C\, it need not follow that A 鈬 C. Understanding the distinctive behaviour of ST on an inferential level involves considering not only valid formulas and valid inferences but also valid聽meta-inferences. However\, keeping track of this ever-growing tower of consequence relations is also difficult. \nIn this talk\, I aim to address both of these issues in one go. I will exploit the relationship between LP and ST\, and some prior work on mildly bilateral treatments of natural deduction to provide a novel natural deduction proof system for both LP and ST that has the following features: \n\nEach connective rule is a standard natural deduction rule\, familiar from Gentzen.\nEach connective is uniquely characterised by rules governing it.\nThe difference between LP and ST on the one hand\, and classical logic on the other\, is the addition of a purely structural rule.\nThe relationship between the valid formulas\, the valid sequents\, and the valid meta-sequents in each of the logics in question (LP\, ST and classical logic) is uniquely and systematically determined by the rules governing the construction of proofs in the underlying calculus.\n\nThe aim of this exercise is not is to not only get a better understanding the breadth of the range of options for inferential presentations of logic LP and ST\, but to also deepen our understanding of the relationship between natural deduction and the sequent calculus (and meta-inferential relations above the level of the sequent)\, and the distinctive role of structural rules from each of these perspectives. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-greg-restall-the-logic-of-paradox-as-a-substructural-logic/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260220T075413Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260513T190826Z UID:10002743-1779289200-1779296400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-18/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260514T190820Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260520T195325Z UID:10002893-1779289200-1779296400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Luna Guan: 鈥淪implicity without Identity鈥 DESCRIPTION:The doctrine of divine simplicity serves two roles in Christian theology鈥攊t upholds the creator-creation distinction by saying that only the divine ontology is absolutely simple whereas every other created being is a composite\, and it supports divine aseity by identifying the divine attributes with God. Traditional and contemporary versions of divine simplicity have filled these roles by assuming constituent ontology. Relational ontologies face two problems: God and creation are both metaphysically simple as the relational framework itself denies metaphysical parts; and a relational understanding of property as commonality is a violation of divine aseity. This paper presents an identity-less and non-trivial model of divine simplicity based in a relational ontology. By adopting prototype theory for qualitative spaces\, the two roles of divine simplicity are satisfied\, and the infamous theistic identity claims are avoided. Theories of properties based on conceptual spaces\, using qualitative notions of similarity\, and prototypes are common in philosophy of cognitive science. In this model\, divine attributes are properties understood as regions of qualitative spaces. Additionally\, understanding divine aseity in terms of metaphysical grounding\, I argue that prototypes and the proximity relations together ground the properties. Thus\, God and some facts about proximity are each a partial ground for the property goodness. By definition\, God鈥檚 goodness is at zero proximity to the prototype. As a result\, God is the full ground of God鈥檚 properties. This means that they all metaphysically depend on God alone\, which affirms divine aseity. This model shows that identity is not the core of the strong account of divine simplicity\, rather a consequence of attempting to articulate the doctrine within a particular ontological framework. The aim is to consider what divine simplicity would look like with a paradigm shift away from the constituent ontologies of Aquinas and the Thomists. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-luna-guan-simplicity-without-identity/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260527T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260527T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260226T080900Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260515T190845Z UID:10002753-1779894000-1779901200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-19/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T135607 CREATED:20260516T190823Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260528T202316Z UID:10002894-1779980400-1779987600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Christopher Masterman: 鈥淎re abstraction principles all that explanatory?鈥濃 DESCRIPTION:An increasingly popular view is that abstracta are thin鈥攖heir existence alone makes little or no demand on the world. The most sophisticated defence of this view to date is the version of abstractionism found in Linnebo鈥檚 recent book Thin Objects (2018). On this view\, good abstraction principles should be understood as involving claims about asymmetric metaphysical dependencies between abstracta (e.g.\, directions\, letter types\, sets) and more familiar objects (e.g.\, lines\, letter tokens\, pluralities). In many ways\, such a view is a highly promising development of more traditional versions of abstractionism. However\, in this paper\, I argue that it\, and any view sufficiently like it\, should ultimately be rejected\, since it cannot adequately respond to a neglected explanatory challenge鈥攚hat I call the characterisation challenge. This is the demand that any theory of abstracta should accommodate explanations for why abstracta are the way they are. In short\, I argue that the nature of abstracta problematically outstrips the explanatory resources available to this kind of 鈥榤etaphysically serious鈥 abstractionism. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-christopher-masterman-why-are-abstracta-the-way-they-are/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR