Our epistemic lives are marked by discoveries, changes of mind, epiphanies (if we are lucky), and 鈥榯urning points鈥� 鈥� some of them potentially radical in nature. We may call these events epistemic breakthroughs. This workshop invites philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists to think about the nature, varieties, and causation of such breakthroughs, as well as…
Abstract: Inadequacies in our interpretive resources are epistemically and communicatively disabling; in some cases, these inadequacies can constitute (hermeneutic) injustice. Accounts of hermeneutic injustice have primarily centred on the absence of necessary resources; however, critics have highlighted cases in which the problem is a resource we do possess (鈥榩ositive hermeneutic injustice鈥�). In this talk I…
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to sketch a conception of ideology that draws on the critical theory tradition. This conception of ideology is a response to a particular challenge for those working on social justice: Why is it that most of us, most of the time, act in ways that perpetuate injustice? To…
Abstract: Evidentialism is the view that evidence alone determines rational belief. Recently, several rivals to evidentialism have been defended, including pragmatic and moral encroachment, epistemic partiality, and practical and moral reasons for belief. Call these rivals 鈥渋mpurist鈥� views. While impuirst views have both compelling cases and interesting arguments in their favor, they also face a…
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